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I. INTRODUCTION
[Those] who commit environmental crimes - particularly those
involving hazardous wastes - commonly demonstrate a complete
disrespect for the law and disregard for the safety of others, and
are motivated by a desire to enjoy the substantial profits that can
be derived from such illegal activities.'
The commission of environmental crimes is inevitable since
hazardous waste can be generated by anyone, at any time, in
any part of the world. In a corporate environment, these crimes
are often committed by "blue-collar" employees 2 at the direc-
tion, or lack of direction, of "white-collar" employees 3 who are
aware of the dangerous effects of the activities associated with
the generation, management, storage, and disposal of hazard-
ous waste. 4 Ultimately, it is the employer, the corporate entity,
1 Judson W. Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 379, 382 (1986). This statement was made during a speech delivered by
the author before the Environmental Law Committee of the International Bar As-
sociation, Business Law Section, in Vienna, Austria on September 5, 1984.
2 "Blue-collar" employees are generally categorized as those employed in a
non-supervisory or non-managerial position and who are typically paid on a hourly
basis. For example, in a manufacturing environment, the "blue-collar" employees
who typically are involved with the on-site movement and storage of hazardous
waste are maintenance and/or production employees.
3 Employees categorized as "white-collar" are those employees in a supervi-
sory or management position who are typically paid on a salary basis. In a manu-
facturing environment, "white-collar" employees who typically have direct
responsibility for the on-site movement and storage of hazardous waste are the
Plant Engineer, Environmental Manager and/or Production Supervisors/Manag-
ers. The Plant Manager at a manufacturing facility will typically not have direct
responsibility for the on-site movement and storage of hazardous waste, but ulti-
mately has the responsibility to ensure that the on-site movement and storage of
hazardous waste, as well as the off-site shipment and disposal of hazardous waste,
is properly and safely performed by his/her subordinates.
4 "[Environmental] crimes are often committed in highly regulated areas by
professionals who are aware of the dangerous propensities and potentials of their
work." JONATHON TURLEY, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT AND SEN-
TENCING 11 (1994). Supervisory and management employees whose responsibility
includes the management of hazardous waste are typically aware of the dangerous
effects of the activities associated with hazardous waste by virtue of their educa-
tional background, experience and/or continuing education in the area of waste
management. For example, the regulations promulgated under the United States'
statute (see infra note 10) governing the management of hazardous waste require
annual training for those individuals involved with hazardous waste management.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/10
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who potentially benefits from the illegal activities of its
employees. 5
When the government 6 comes "knocking on the door,"7 with
the intent of identifying and punishing the violator of an envi-
ronmental law, who should have a cause for concern, the em-
ployees or the corporation? One point of view is that "[wihile
individuals can be incarcerated, corporations cannot, [t]hus the
deterrent value of criminal convictions is generally more potent
where individuals rather than ... corporations are involved."8
A contrary view suggests that "[criminal sanctions against
[both] business[es] and individuals drive home the fact that vio-
See 40 C.F.R. § 264.16. In order to comply with this regulation in an economical
manner, the Plant Manager of a manufacturing facility will typically send his/her
Plant Engineer, Environmental Manager and/or Production Supervisors/Managers
to a commercial training course hosted by an "expert" in the field. These individu-
als, in-turn, impart their acquired knowledge to the "blue-collar" employees via
informal, on-site training sessions.
5 Throughout this Casenote, the terms "corporate entity" and "company" will
be used interchangeably. The relevance of these terms, as used in the Casenote, is
to denote the difference between a legal entity created by statute, which employs
individuals for the purpose of achieving the goals of the legal entity. In addition,
while the activities of many types of legal entities are involved in the generation,
management, storage and/or disposal of hazardous waste, Parts IV.B. and IV.C. of
this Casenote consider the following scenario: a large manufacturing company,
during the production of their widget product line, generates a waste by-product
that must be classified as hazardous and shipped off-site for proper treatment, re-
cycling and/or disposal in accordance with applicable regulations. Subsequent to
its generation, but prior to shipment off-site, "blue-collar" employees of the com-
pany are responsible for placing the waste in containers, labeling the containers
and moving the waste from the point of generation to an on-site storage location
under the supervision of "white-collar" employees. The "white-collar" employees
are responsible for finding a suitable off-site location to treat, recycle and/or dis-
pose of the waste as well as arranging for the transportation of the waste from the
manufacturing company's facility to the off-site facility.
6 In environmental investigations, the government authorities carrying out
an investigation at a manufacturing facility can include the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA), its state counterpart (e.g., the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (N.J. DEP)), the Federal Bureau
of Investigations (FBI), and/or local government agencies.
7 This phrase is taken from the title of a handbook dealing with criminal
investigations. JUDSON STARR, THE KNOCK ON THE DOOR: PREPARING FOR AND RE-
SPONDING TO A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1991).
8 JEFFREY G. MILLER & CRAIG N. JOHNSTON, THE LAw OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
DISPOSAL AND REMEDIATION 335 (West 1996).
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lators will pay, and pay dearly for breaking environmental
laws."9
In the United States, the law concerning the generation,
management, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste is ex-
plicit.10 Any person, defined to include an individual as well as
a corporation,11 who knowingly violates the requirements for
handling hazardous waste can be held criminally liable. 12 In
the United Kingdom, the law is not so precise.
The United Kingdom's recent attempt to enact a compre-
hensive code for environmental law is based on the familiar
"duty of care"13 principle derived from the law of tort and
adopted by the Parliament on previous occasions. 14 Effective
April st 1992, The United Kingdom's Environmental Protection
Act 199015 imposed a statutory duty of care on any person who
imports, produces, carries, keeps, treats or disposes of a con-
trolled waste.' 6 The central theme "of the common law princi-
9 STARR, supra note 7 at preface quoting former United States Attorney Gen-
eral Richard Thornburg.
10 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988)
[hereinafter RCRA].
11 "The term 'person' means an individual, trust, firm, joint stock company,
corporation (including a government corporation), partnership, association, State,
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body
and shall include each department, agency and instrumentality of the United
States." Id. § 6903(15).
12 See id. § 6928(d). If the mishandling described therein also "places another
person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury," this "knowing endan-
germent" subjects the actor to further criminal liability. See id. § 6928(e).
13 "An obligation, recognized by the law, requiring actor to conform to certain
standard of conduct for protection of others against unreasonable risks." BLAcK's
LAw DICTIoNARY 505 (6th Ed. 1990).
14 Waste Disposal - The New Law, ESTATES GAZETTE, Nov. 28, 1992, at 83.
15 Environmental Protection Act, 1990, § 34(1) (Eng.) (EPA 1990). This duty
of care is intended to clarify, and has replaced, the regulatory framework con-
tained in the Control of Pollution Act 1974 (COPA) which did not clearly delineate
the person responsible for the waste during its various stages of life. See James
Driscoll, Waste and Contaminated Land, 142 NEW L. J. 503 (1992), available in
LEXIS, Ukjnl library, Njl file. Although flawed in many respects, COPA provided
the United Kingdom with its first comprehensive control over the disposal of
waste. See Tim Smithers, UK Environmental Protection - The Waste Management
Regime, ESTATES GAZETrE, July 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News library, Txtnws
file.
16 EPA 1990, § 34(1). The equivalent terms used in the United States are
"generator," "transporter," and "stores" rather than "importer," "carrier," and
"keeps" respectively. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903. Facilities to which waste is shipped by
a generator are referred to by the acronym "TSDF" (Treatment, Storage and Dispo-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/10
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ple is that a person owes a duty not to injure others by his acts
or omissions."17 The EPA 1990, however, neither defines the
"person" who has the duty of care, nor pronounces whether cor-
porate entities are to be held accountable for a breach of the
duty of care.' 8
In Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securi-
ties Commission'9 the House of Lords was required to interpret
a statute20 whose language was "applicable to a natural person
and require[d] some act or state of mind on the part of that per-
son 'himself,' as opposed to his servants or agents."2' The
House of Lords analyzed how this type of statute should be ap-
plied to a company, if indeed, it was intended for such applica-
tion. The Lords concluded that one cannot merely search for
the "directing mind and will"22 in these types of cases; but
rather, a special rule of attribution must be formulated on a
case by case basis. In Meridian Global Funds, the House of
Lords took this approach by looking at the construction and lan-
guage of the statute, its content, and the underlying policy.
The duty of care provision embodied in the EPA 199023 will
require courts to fashion a special rule of attribution. Section
34 of the EPA 1990 is the type of statutory provision that the
House of Lords in Meridian Global Funds would categorize as
an "exceptional case."'24 The language of Section 34 of the EPA
1990 is primarily applicable to a natural person, requiring the
sal Facilities). See infra note 29 for a discussion on the classification of waste as
defined by the waste laws in the United States and the United Kingdom.
17 Waste Disposal - The New Law, supra note 14.
18 See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
19 [1995] 3 WLR 413 (P.C.) (appeal taken from N.Z.).
20 Securities Amendment Act, 1988 (N.Z.), § 20(3), (4) (1988).
21 Meridian Global Funds, [1995] 3 W.L.R. at 419.
22 See id. at 418 (citing Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. V. Asiatic Petroleum Co.
Ltd., [1915] A.C. 705, 713 (speech of Viscount Haldane L.C.)). English law, prior to
Meridian Global Funds, in determining the criminal mens rea of an organization
considered that of a person deemed to be a "directing mind and will" to the com-
pany. See L.S. Sealy, The Corporate Ego and Agency Untwined, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.
J. 507, 509 (1995). The conceptual challenge of mens rea offenses is overcome by
the identification of "white-collar" employees who "direct the mind" of the company
towards the commission of a crime. See Celia Wells, A Quiet Revolution in Corpo-
rate Liability for Crime, 145 NEW L. J. 1326, 1326 (1995).
23 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
24 For the purpose of attributing liability to a company for the act or state of
mind of an employee, the House of Lords generally classified statutes containing
criminal provisions as "exceptional cases" since these statutes only speak to the
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individual to breach his or her duty of care when handling haz-
ardous waste for potential criminal penalties to attach.
Historically, the United Kingdom and the United States
have taken dissimilar approaches in an attempt to achieve the
goal of protecting human health and the environment. The
United Kingdom's recent efforts to strengthen their environ-
mental laws,25 have narrowed the gap between the two nations'
approaches. Thus, during this Casenote's discussion and analy-
sis there is a natural tendency, where appropriate, to make ref-
erence to the United States' approach. The groundwork for
these abbreviated diversions to the United States' application of
environmental law is laid in Part II which provides a brief sy-
nopsis of the hazardous waste laws in the United States and the
United Kingdom.
As a member of the European Community (EC), the United
Kingdom is obligated to enact laws to effectuate EC directives. 26
This legislative framework is summarized in Part III.A. Unlike
the EPA 1990, EC law does not establish penalties; thus, Part
III.B. explores the validity of an EC member state's criminal
provisions for hazardous waste violations, as pronounced by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Part III.C. concludes this dis-
cussion by assessing whether the United Kingdom has the au-
thority to convict companies and individuals who violate the
EPA 1990 based upon the application of the ECJ's criteria.
Part V.A. discusses the House of Lords decision in Merid-
ian Global Funds and specifically why the statute under consid-
eration required that a special rule of attribution be
formulated. Additionally, this section identifies the factors the
Lords believe are necessary to formulate special rules of attri-
bution for exceptional cases in the future. Part IV.B. and Part
IV.C. answer the two queries posed by the House of Lords in
actus rcus and mens rea of the defendant with regard to the imposition of liability.
Meridian Global Funds, at 419.
25 If harm to human health or the environment can occur, even if the condi-
tions set forth in the company's hazardous waste license are being complied with,
liability for the management, storage or disposal of hazardous waste can attach.
See EPA 1990, § 33. With regard to the public, "pollution of the environment" is
considered to have occurred if "offence to any of his senses or harm to his property
[takes place, so] the smell or the sight of a landfill site could constitute an offence."
Waste Disposal - The New Law, supra note 14, at 83; see also EPA 1990, § 29 and
infra note 38 for the definition of "pollution of the environment."
26 See infra note 60.
[Vol. 10:237
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Meridian Global Funds. This discussion includes an analysis of
previous decisions by the House of Lords in addressing whose
actus reus and mens rea are to be deemed that of the company
itself. Part IV.D. fashions an attribution rule tailored to the
language and policy of the controlled waste duty of care as advo-
cated by the House of Lords. Part V concludes the Casenote by
surmising whether the House of Lords would attribute a breach
of duty, related to the management of controlled waste, by an
employee to his employer.
II. THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: UNITED STATES VERSUS
UNITED KINGDOM
The generation and disposal of hazardous waste are as
common to the United States27 and the United Kingdom 28 as
are the English language and democratic governments. 29 While
the United States and the United Kingdom share many societal
interests, historically they have shared neither a common ap-
proach to regulating the management of waste30 nor the en-
27 The annual volume of waste generated in the United States has been esti-
mated at three to four billion tons. See H.R. REP. NO. 1491, pt. 1, at 2 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6239.
28 The annual volume of domestic, commercial and industrial waste generated
in the United Kingdom has been estimated at 140 million tons. See Stephen
Hoare, UK Construction News Environment Supplement - Nice Line in Waste,
CONSTRUCTION NEWS, Mar. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, News library, Txtnws
file. Note, however, that there is no duty of care on an "occupier of a domestic
property as respects the household waste produced on the property." EPA 1990,
§ 34(2). The House of Commons Environmental Committee on Toxic Waste re-
ported the generation of approximately 2.5 million tons of waste in Britain in 1989.
See Driscoll, supra note 15, at 503.
29 See Bradford S. Gentry, Regulation of Hazardous Waste in the United
States and Britain, 12 INTL. ENVTL. REP. 82 (1989).
30 "Waste," in the simplest of terms, means an item that once benefited society
but is no longer of use. The United States and the United Kingdom define waste
differently, however, both countries attempt to distinguish those items that are
wastes from those that are useful products. See id. In the United States, the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act is the federal regulation that administers
the generation, storage and disposal of waste. See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 - 6992k
(1994). The starting point for a legal practitioner or environmental professional in
the United States is with the term "solid waste." See Identification and Listing of
Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (1997). After navigating through RCRA's
complex definition of the term "solid waste" and corresponding exceptions for "re-
cycled waste," legal practitioners and environmental professionals refer to waste
that is the most regulated as "RCRA hazardous waste."
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forcement of such regulations. 31 In the United States, the
generation, storage and disposal of hazardous waste is regu-
lated by RCRA.32 Although RCRA has been characterized as
Conversely, the starting point for those in the United Kingdom is with the
term "controlled waste." See COPA § 30 and EPA 1990, § 75. Waste which is cov-
ered by The Framework Directive of Waste is to be considered "controlled waste."
See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text; SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE ENVI-
RONMENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF SCOTLAND AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR WALES, WASTE MANAGEMENT, THE DUTY OF CARE: A CODE OF PRACTICE, 6 n.6
(HMSO Publications Centre Mar. 1996) [hereinafter WASTE MANAGEMENT, THE
DUTY OF CARE]. A waste "does not need to be hazardous or toxic to be a controlled
waste" and thus, controlled waste in the United Kingdom is equivalent to a "solid
waste" in the United States. See DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, LEAFLET,
DUTY OF CARE (1995). A "controlled waste" having hazardous properties is catego-
rized as "special waste" and, thus, equivalent to the United States' term "RCRA
hazardous waste." Compare DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, WELSH OFFICE,
SCOTTISH OFFICE, SPECIAL WASTE REGULATIONS at 3 (Oct. 1996); cf The Special
Waste Regulations, S.I. 1996 No. 72, amended by The Special Waste (Amendment)
Regulations, S.I. 1996 No. 2019, and Identification and Listing of Hazardous
Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 261.20 - .24 (1997) (describing the properties that categorize a
waste as "special" and "hazardous," respectively). Hence, a "special waste" in the
United Kingdom is a subset of a "controlled waste" and, thus, subject to the EPA
1990 Duty of Care provisions. Waste that would be classified as "RCRA hazardous
waste" in the United State or a "controlled waste" in the United Kingdom is generi-
cally referred to as "toxic waste." For an in-depth discussion and comparison of
"RCRA hazardous waste" and "controlled waste," see Gentry, supra note 29, at 82.
31 See Gentry, supra note 29 at 82. Historically, local authorities were
charged with the waste regulation functions in the United Kingdom. See New Re-
gime for Waste Licensing to be Introduced in April 1993, 15 IN'L ENVTL. CURRENT
REP. 545, 556 (Aug. 26, 1992). In July 1992, Environmental Secretary Michael
Howard announced that the Environmental Protection Agency would assume over-
all responsibility for the enforcement of the waste regulations contained in the
EPA 1990. See id. This agency never developed, as waste regulation functions
were transferred to: the Environment Agency (in England and Wales), by Section 2
of the Environment Act, 1995 (Eng.); and the Scottish Environment Protection
Agency and the Department of the Environment Northern Ireland, by Section 21 of
the Environment Act, 1995 (Eng.). See WASTE MANAGEMENT, THE DUTY OF CARE:
A CODE OF PRACTICE at 3 (HMSO Publication Centre, Mar. 1996). In the United
States, hazardous waste regulations are enforced by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and/or its state counterpart, providing the state has an authorized
hazardous waste program. See 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1994).
32 RCRA was enacted to provide "a multifaceted approach for solving the
problems associated with the three to four billion tons of discarded [waste] gener-
ated each year, and the problems resulting from the anticipated 8 percent annual
increase in the volume of such waste." H.R. REP. NO. 1491, supra note 27. Con-
gress intended RCRA to serve as a regulatory scheme that would control hazard-
ous materials from "cradle-to-grave" in order to provide "nationwide protection
against the dangers of improper hazardous waste disposal." Id. at 11.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/10
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being complex,33 the regulations demonstrate extraordinary
foresight in minimizing risk through detailed, legally binding
requirements that are applicable to all involved, during each
stage of the management of hazardous waste.34 The objective of
these regulations is to prevent environmental harm by ensuring
the person responsible for the management of the hazardous
waste is aware of, and subject to, strict consequences. Effective
measures to minimize the risk of improperly maintained haz-
ardous waste are the criminal provisions in RCRA, which are
applicable to natural and legal persons alike. 35
Conversely, the regulation of the management and disposal
of waste in the United Kingdom has historically been based
upon traditional tort principals following evidence of harm to
human health or the environment. 36 The emphasis of the Con-
trol of Pollution Act 1974 was on waste disposal. In an attempt
to correct perceived deficiencies 37 in this approach to regulating
waste, the United Kingdom enacted EPA 1990 which now
places an emphasis on waste management.
Specifically, the statutory duty of care requires any person
who comes in contact with hazardous waste to take all reason-
able precautions: (i) to prevent any other person from contra-
33 ... RCRA is a regulatory cuckoo land of definition ... [and] ... is very
complex. I believe we have five people in the [Federal EPA] who under-
stand what 'hazardous waste' is. What's hazardous one year isn't - wasn't
hazardous yesterday, is hazardous tomorrow, because we've changed the
rules. You have a waste in one state is hazardous and in another isn't
because they haven't adopted a rule yet.... It is a legal statutory frame-
work rather than logical, based on concentration and threat type of thing.
United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 882 (E.D. Wa. 1991) (quoting Don R.
Clay, EPA Assistant Administrator for the EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emer-
gency Response).
34 See Gentry, supra note 29.
35 See supra notes 11 and 12 and accompanying text.
36 See Gentry, supra note 29.
37 Commentators have noted that some of the more seriously flawed provi-
sions in COPA included: (i) the difficulty of holding violators accountable due to the
technicalities associated with the legal aspects of enforcement; (ii) the inability of
the regulating authority to control the issuance and transfer of waste disposal li-
cense making the waste disposal industry available to operators who were unethi-
cal and/or had a criminal background; and (iii) the ability of waste disposal
operators to freely relinquish their license to the regulating authority if they en-
countered financial or technical difficulties which resulted in the regulating au-
thorities having control of problem waste disposal sites. Smithers, supra note 15.
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vening Section 33 of the EPA 1990,38 (ii) to prevent the "escape"
of the waste from his control, (iii) to ensure the transferor of
waste is not to an unauthorized person for transportation or
disposal, and (iv) to ensure the subsequent persons handling
the waste do not breach the duty of care by providing an ade-
quate written description of the waste and its associated
hazards. 39 A breach of the duty of care is a criminal offense 40
irrespective of whether the breach causes harm to human
health or to the environment. 41
This statutory duty of care is supported by a Code of Prac-
tice.42 Those persons who have a statutory duty of care should
follow the guidance provided by the Code of Practice4 3 to dis-
charge the obligations imposed by Section 34 of the EPA 1990. 44
The Code of Practice is considered to have statutory force and is
admissible as evidence in order to aid the judge in assessing
38 It is a criminal offense to: (i) perform treatment, recovery or disposal activi-
ties without a waste management license; (ii) knowingly cause or permit the afore-
mentioned activities to be performed; or (iii) treat or dispose of waste in a manner
likely to cause "pollution of the environment" or harm to human health. See EPA
1990 § 33. "Pollution of the environment" is broadly defined to include the escape
or release of waste which is capable of causing harm to the health of living orga-
nisms or other interference with their ecological systems. See id. § 28.
39 See id. § 34(1).
40 See id. § 34(6). A fine not exceeding £5,000 on summary conviction or an
unlimited fine upon conviction on indictment can be imposed for a breach of the
duty of care. See WASTE MANAGEMENT, THE DUTY OF CARE, supra note 30, at 43.
The statutory penalties in the EPA 1990 are so-called "either-way" penalties which
can be contested before the magistrate's court or the crown court. See Michael
Cover & Fiona Gill, UK Construction News Environmental Supplement - Crime
and Punishment, CONSTRUCTION NEWS, Mar. 18, 1993. The maximum penalty im-
posed for environmental violations in the magistrate's court is £20,000. See id.
Crown courts can impose unlimited fines and imprisonment of up to two years for
environmental violations. See id.
41 See WASTE MANAGEMENT, THE DUTY OF CARE, supra note 30 at 42-43.
42 EPA, 1990, pt .J, § 34(7). The current code of practice, WASTE MANAGE-
MENT, THE DUTY OF CARE, supra note 30, updates the original code of practice that
was published in December 1991 in advance of the promulgation of the duty of care
provisions in April 1992. UK: DOE - Revised Duty of Care Code of Practice on
Waste Published, HERMES - UK GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASES, Mar. 21, 1996.
43 Guidelines, for those having a statutory duty of care pursuant to Section 34
EPA 1990, are provided in the Code of Practice for the following topics: (i) waste
identification by the producer of the waste, (ii) safe transportation of the waste,
(iii) screening of transferee, (iv) verification of the waste transferor, (v) auditing of
the treatment, storage or disposal facility to which the waste is shipped, and (vi)
outside expert consultation. See WASTE MANAGEMENT, THE DUTY OF CARE, supra
note 30.
44 See Waste Disposal - The New Law, supra note 14.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/10
1998] CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR A CORPORATION 247
whether reasonable measures, regarding compliance with the
statutory duty of care, were taken.45
The Code of Practice, however, also appears to definitively
address the issue on which this Casenote is based: does a
breach of the controlled waste duty of care invoke corporate lia-
bility? Pursuant to Annex A of the Code of Practice,
"[e]mployers are responsible for the acts and omissions of their
employees [and,] therefore[,] should provide adequate equip-
ment, training and supervision to ensure that their employees
observe the duty of care."46 According to the Code of Practice's
introduction, the annexes are considered to be a part of the
Code. 47
Pursuant to Section 34 of the EPA 1990, however, the Sec-
retary of State is required to "prepare and issue a code of prac-
tice for the purpose of providing to persons practical guidance on
how to discharge the duty imposed on them by subsection (1) [of
Section 34 EPA 1990]."48 Thus, the statutory mandate for the
development of the Code of Practice is for the limited purpose of
providing practical guidance on how to discharge the duty of
care in handling controlled waste and not to impute liability to
an individual's employer. This is supported by the fact that,
consistent with the enunciated duties of care in Section 34 of
the EPA 1990, the code of practice uses the term "person." In
sum, it appears that the inclusion of the provision, allowing em-
ployers to be held responsible for the acts and omissions of their
employees, in the Code of Practice by the Secretary of State is
based on the longstanding doctrine of respondeat superior 49
rather than the statutory authority granted by Parliament.
The United Kingdom, by promulgation of the EPA 1990, ap-
pears to have created a strikingly similar regulatory mecha-
nism to manage hazardous waste from "cradle-to-grave" as
45 See Driscoll, supra note 15, at 503. "[The] code of practice . . .shall be
admissible in evidence and if any provision of such a code appears to the court to
be relevant to any question arising in the proceedings it shall be taken into account
in determining that question." EPA, 1990, § 34(10).
46 DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 41, at 41.
47 See id. at 3.
48 EPA, 1990, § 34(7).
49 For a discussion of "the hesitancy of criminal law" to adopt the doctrine of
respondent superior, see Susan W. Brenner, Civil Complicity: Using the Pinkerton
Doctrine to Impose Vicarious Liability in Civil RICO Actions, 81 Ky. L. J. 369, 369
n.54, 378 n.108 (1993).
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required by the United States' RCRA regulations. 50 EPA 1990
regulates the management of waste in the United Kingdom
throughout the entire waste cycle, from "cradle to grave."51 The
responsibility for waste is now equally distributed between
those who produce, carry, store, and ultimately dispose of the
waste.52
While the United States' judicial system was upholding the
first criminal conviction of a corporate defendant for violating a
RCRA provision in 1989, 5 3 the United Kingdom's criminal pro-
visions for the violation of hazardous waste did not become ef-
fective until April P t 1992. As a result of the promulgation of
these regulations, waste in the United Kingdom "is now every-
one's problem," 54 but a question remains as to who is everyone.
The lack of an explicit reference to corporate liability in the
EPA 1990's duty of care provision creates a hurdle for the
United Kingdom's judicial system to overcome if the deterrent
and compensatory goals of the EPA 1990 are to be achieved. 55
50 Initially coined by Congress, the phrase "cradle-to-grave" is recognized by
the United States' judicial system as means of communicating the comprehensive
nature of RCRA. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes International Corporation, 786
F.2d 1499, 1501 n.23 (1986) (noting the creation of a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory
scheme by Congress). In comparison to the human life cycle on which it is based,
the phrase, "cradle-to-grave" simply means from the generation of waste to the
burial of waste. See id.
51 Smithers, supra note 15.
52 See id.
53 United States v. Protex Industries, 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989). Protex
Industries was a drum recycling facility and the company was charged with know-
ingly placing three of its employees in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury. See id. at 740. The court rejected Protex Industries' argument, which was
based on the void for vagueness doctrine, by noting that "the essence of the doc-
trine is that a potential defendant must have some notice or 'fair warning' that the
conduct contemplated is forbidden by the criminal law." Id. at 743. This notice
came via the "Special Rules" Congress provided in RCRA for interpretation of the
knowing endangerment provision. See id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f) (1988).
54 John Cridland, Confederation of British Industry - Director of Environmen-
tal Affairs, as quoted in an April 9, 1996 interview with the Bureau of National
Affairs, Inc. Industry 'Ill- Prepared' for System to Regulate Waste Business Official
Says, INT'L ENVTL. CURRENT REP. 217, 240 (Apr 22, 1992).
55 The EC's Member States annually generate approximately 160 million tons
of industrial waste of which twenty to thirty million tons is considered to be haz-
ardous waste. See Paul Luiki & Dale Stephenson, European Community Waste
Policy: At the Brink of a New Era, 14 INTL ENV'T REP. 403, 408 (July 17, 1991).
Proper and, hence, legal disposal of hazardous waste by the EC's Member States is
limited, by capacity, to approximately ten million metric tons of hazardous waste
per year. See id.
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The holding of Meridian Global Funds is an important starting
point.56
III. THE LEGALITY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO BRING
CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST THOSE WHO BREACH EPA's
1990 DuTY OF CARE PROVISION
Environmental legislation in the EC is created by the incor-
poration of progressive steps that each of the Member States
believes it can achieve.5 7 This legislation typically comes in the
form of directives, the contemplated results of which are bind-
ing on the Member States, and regulations which are "binding
in their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States."5 8
In contrast, the United States' legislature often seeks instant
achievement of its environmental goals via the adoption of ag-
gressive regulations and penalties for non-compliance. 59
A. Legislative Framework of European Community
Environmental Law
The European Community6° is the result of several political
and economic associations, arising generally out of a desire for
56 Corporate Liability-"Knowledge," SIMMONS & SIMMONS, ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION BRIEFING, Mar. 1996, at 7.
57 See Gentry, supra note 29.
58 Hila J. Alderman, The Ghost of Progress Past: A Comparison of Approaches
to Hazardous Waste Liability in the European Community and the United States,
16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 311, 317 n.40 (1993) (quoting European Economic Treaty, art.
189).
59 See Gentry, supra note 29.
60 See The Treaty on European Union, as amended by The Maastricht Treaty,
1992 O.J. 224; Daniel W. Simcox, The Future of Europe Lies in Waste: The Impor-
tance of the Proposed Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste to
the European Community and its Environmental Policy, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
546 n.1 (1995) (citing Josephine Steiner, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAw 3 (3d ed. 1992)).
"The 1992 Treaty on European Union, also known as the Maastricht Treaty, has
engendered confusion regarding the proper name for the supranational organiza-
tion formed by the states of Europe." Id. '2Jnder the Maastricht Treaty, it is ap-
propriate to refer to the European Union only when discussing certain
competencies set forth in the Treaty; in these new areas of power, the term Euro-
pean Union should be used." Id. "Regarding all other powers, the older term Euro-
pean Community is still appropriate." Id. "It is appropriate, for example, to refer
to the European Union with regard to matters of citizenship, common foreign and
security policy, as well as issues of justice and home affairs." Id. "The term Euro-
pean Community should be used in the following areas: competition, company law,
environmental issues, banking, insurance, and the free movement of goods and
services." (Emphasis added) Id. (citing Current Developments: Recent Legal Devel-
249
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unity after years of strife; it is the inevitable result of the "ever
close union among the peoples of Europe."61 The precursors es-
tablished unified transnational efforts in narrowly defined
fields, unlike the sweeping ambit of the current incarnation. 62
In April, 1951, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg established the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which sought to cre-
ate a common market and production for coal and steel.63 The
fruition of the ECSC quickly led to further attempts at unifica-
tion, successfully in 1957 in the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)64 and the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC).65
"The goal of the three treaties creating these three Communi-
ties was integration through economic cooperation and pro-
gress; closer political cooperation could not yet be realized."66
Together, these three treaties and their subsequent amend-
ments67 form the constitutional framework of the present Euro-
opments of the European Community, 4 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 189 n.11 (1994)).
"Some writers in the area, however, have chosen to refer to the European Union
after Maastricht, and to reserve the term European Community for those acts that
transpired before Maastricht." Simcox, supra. (citing Ethan T. James, Note, An
American Werewolf in London: Applying the Lessons of Superfund to Great Britain,
19 YALE J. INT'L L. 349 & n.4 (1994)). Consistent with Daniel Simcox's explana-
tion, this Casenote will use the term European Community.
61 Id. at art. A. See also David O'Keeffe, Current Issues in European Integra-
tion, 7 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).
62 See id.
63 See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
Apr. 18. 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
64 See Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM) (Rome), 298 UNTS 167.
65 See Treaty Establishing The European Economic Community (EEC), Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (also known as the Treaty of Rome).
66 See Dieter Kugelmann, The Maastricht Treaty and the Design of a Euro-
pean Federal State, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 335, 337 (1994), citing THOMAS
OPPERMAN, EUROPARECH, at 19-22 (1st ed. 1991) and K. LIPSTEIN, THE LAw OF THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 10 (1st ed. 1974).
67 Including, of particular note, the Single European Act of 1986 (SEA), re-
printed in 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
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pean Community. 68 The Community currently comprises
fifteen members. 69
The Treaty of Rome is considered a "framework treaty,"
which establishes broad goals to be achieved and sets forth gen-
eral principles to be followed. 70 In practice, the constitutional
basis for all of EC law is the Treaty of Rome. 71 Prior to 1972,
the Treaty of Rome did not specifically recognize environmental
policy, 72 however, environmental legislation was introduced
under Article 10073 and Article 235. 74 Beginning in 1973, the
EC Council of Ministers75 adopted the first of four Action Pro-
grams on the Environment that, collectively, established the
68 See Heinrich Kirschner, Symposium on U.S.-E.C. Legal Relations: The
Framework of the European Union Under the Treaty of Maastricht, 13 J.L. & COM.
233 (1994); European Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion 1191: European Economic
Space, Europaische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 64, 74 (1992), consid. 21. Indeed, the
six nations involved in these treaties form the core, original membership of the
European Community. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 60.
69 Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined on January 1, 1973. Lisa
Borgfeld White, Comment, The Enforcement of European Union Law: The Role of
the European Court of Justice and the Court's Latest Challenge, 18 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 833, 835 n.10 (1996). Greece joined on January 1, 1981, and Spain and Portugal
joined on January 1, 1986. See Id. (citing GEORGE BERMAN ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 11 (1993)). On January 1, 1995, Fin-
land, Sweden, and Austria became part of the EC. See id.
70 See Simcox, supra note 60, at 553 n.35.
71 See Jon Vine, Turkey, The EEC and Labor Law: Is Harmonization Possi-
ble?, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 445,447 n.14 (citing Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Worker
Rights in the Post-1992 European Communities: What "Social Europe" Means to
United States Based Employers, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 564, 575 (1991)).
72 See Nigel Haigh, The Environmental Policy of the European Community
and 1992, 12 INT'L ENV'T REP. 617, 620 (Dec. 13, 1989).
73 Environmental directives were introduced under Article 100. "An environ-
mental directive was required to harmonize national law directly affecting the es-
tablishment or functioning of the Common Market." See CLIFFORD CHANCE,
EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAw GUIDE 1 (1992).
74 If an environmental measure was necessary to attain one of the objectives
of the EC Treaty, it was introduced under Article 235. See id.
75 The law-making authorities in the EC are the Commission, the Council of
Ministers [hereinafter Council], and the European Parliament [hereinafter Parlia-
ment]. Christian Zacker, Environmental Law of the European Economic Commu-
nity: New Powers Under the Single European Act, 14 B. C. INTL. & COMP. L. REV.
249, 251-55 (1991). The Commissioners, who are appointed by the Member States,
draft the legislation. See id. at 253. The interests of the Member States are repre-
sented by the Council who vote on the enactment of legislation. See id. at 253-54.
The sole function of Parliament is to supervise the Commission and advise the
Council. See id. at 251-52.
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EC's environmental policy through 1992.76 The 5th Action Pro-
gram sets forth the EC's environmental strategy through the
end of the decade by focusing on sustainable development. 77
These Action Programs, which are non-binding, provide an
overview of the general direction and objectives of environmen-
tal policy for the EC.78
In 1987, the Single European Act (SEA) amended the
Treaty of Rome.7 9 As a result, the power of the EC to imple-
ment environmental policy was increased.80 These powers are
enumerated in Articles 100A,8 ' 130R,8 2 130S,3 and 130T8 4 of
the Treaty of Rome.8 5 Under the SEA, EC environmental legis-
lation is typically introduced under Article 100A or Article
76 See Alderman, supra note 58, at 316. "The four programs are: Council Res-
olution on a European Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environ-
ment, 1973 O.J. (C 112) 1; Council Resolution on the Continuation and
Implementation of a European Community Policy and Action Programme on the
Environment, 1977 O.J. (C 139) 1; Council Resolution on the Continuation and
Implementation of a European Community Policy and Action Programme on the
Environment, 1983 O.J. (C 46) 1; and Council Resolution on the Continuation and
Implementation of a European Community Policy and Action Programme on the
Environment, 1987 O.J. (C 328) 1." Id. at 341 n.30 (citing Nigel Haigh, The Envi-
ronmental Policy of the European Community of 1992,12 INT'L ENV'T REP. at 620
(Dec. 13, 1989)).
77 See CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 73, at 2. Sustainable development recog-
nizes that environmental protection is not only inextricably linked to economic
growth, but is necessary to sustain this growth. See id.
78 See Alderman, supra note 58 (citing Haigh, supra note 72, at 620).
79 The Treaty of Rome originally "created a common market which allowed for
the free movement of goods and services." The SEA added the term "internal mar-
ket" empowering the EC to ensure "the free movement of goods, persons, services
and capital." Alderman, supra note 58, at 316 n.35 (citing EEC Treaty, art. 2).
80 See CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 73, at 3.
81 Article 100A provides a basis for effecting the measures to establish and
operate the Single Market. See Treaty of Rome, Jan. 1, 1958, art. 100A, 298
U.N.T.S. 11.
82 Article 130R states that the objectives of the EC's environmental policy is
to "preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment, . . . contribute
towards protecting human health [and] ... ensure a prudent and rational utiliza-
tion of natural resources." See Treaty of Rome, Jan. 1, 1958, art. 130R, 298
U.N.T.S. 11.
83 Article 130S grants authority to the Council for determining EC environ-
mental policy. See Treaty of Rome, Jan. 1, 1958, art. 130S, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
84 Article 130T provides that Member States, in acting upon environmental
provisions set forth by Article 130S, can implement stricter requirements provided
they are comparable with the Treaty of Rome. See Treaty of Rome, Jan. 1, 1958,
art. 130T, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
85 See CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 73, at 3.
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130S.86 Moreover, Article 130S is the principle vehicle for envi-
ronmental legislation when the protection of the environment is
the focus.8 7
The Council, considered the legislative body of the EC, is-
sues directives,8 8 regulations,8 9 decisions,90 and recommenda-
tions. 91 Over the years, the EC has adopted a wide range of
waste management legislation pursuant to Waste Directive 75/
442.92 In May 1990, the Council also adopted a Statement on
Waste Policy that underscored the need to reduce the amount of
waste generated and the principle that the polluter should pay
for damages caused by their waste.9 3 A substantial amendment
effectively replaced Waste Directive 75/442 in March 1991.
94
The new directive, 91/156, known as the Framework Waste Di-
rective, applies the key principles of the Council's waste policy
statement.95 In December 1991, the Council adopted Directive
86 See id. at 6.
87 See id.
88 "Directives shall bind any member state to which they are addressed, as to
the result to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to
form and means." Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar.
25, 1957, art. 189.
89 "Regulations shall have a general application. They shall be binding in
every respect and directly applicable in each Member State." Id.
90 "Decisions shall be binding in every respect for the addresses named
therein." Id.
91 "Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force." Id.
92 See CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 73, at 14.
93 Council Resolution of 7 May 1990 on waste policy, 1990 O.J. (C 122) 2.
... Whereas, in the interest of environmental protection, there is a need
for a comprehensive waste policy in the Community which deals with all
waste, regardless of whether it is to be recycled, reused or disposed of; ...
Whereas the production of waste should, where possible, be prevented or
reduced at source, particularly by the use of clean or low waste technolo-
gies and products;... CONSIDERS that, in evaluating the different pre-
vention, recycling and disposal options, the full economic, social and
environmental implications should be taken into account and that the
principle of the polluter pays should be fully applied; ...
Id.
94 Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991 (amending Directive 75/
442/EEC on waste, 1991 O.J. (L 78)). "Directive 75/442/EEC is hereby amended as
follows: 1. Articles 1 to 12 are replaced by the following: . . ." Id.
95 Council Directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991 amending Directive 75/
442/EEC on waste, 1991 O.J. (L 78). See, e.g., Article 3 ("Member States shall take
appropriate measures to encourage ... the prevention or reduction of waste pro-
duction and its harmfulness . . . "); Article 4 ("Member States shall take the neces-
sary measures to ensure that waste is recovered or disposed of without
endangering human health and without using processes or methods which could
17
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91/689, which supplements the Framework Waste Directive by
promulgating specific rules for the management of hazardous
waste. 96 Generators of hazardous waste remain subject to the
general requirements for waste management in the Framework
Waste Directive. 97 One of the key elements in 91/956 imposes
an obligation on the Member States to ensure that waste is not
abandoned or otherwise disposed of illegally. 98 In response, the
United Kingdom promulgated EPA 1990 with its duty of care
provision.
B. The Validity of a Member State's Criminal Provisions for
Hazardous Waste Violations as Pronounced by the
European Court of Justice.
The EC is unique in that it has been empowered by its
Member States with autonomous institutions. 99 Those areas
covered by the Treaty of Rome are addressed by the EC by vir-
tue of the authority granted to it by the member states.'10  The
uniqueness of the EC results from the manner by which its law
"penetrates the domestic legal systems of Member States, and
harm the environment . . ."); Article 5 ("Member States shall take appropriate
measures, in cooperation with other Member States where this is necessary or ad-
visable, to establish an integrated and adequate network of disposal installations,
taking account of the best technology not involving excessive costs .. ."); Article 6
("Member States shall establish or designate the competent authority or authori-
ties to be responsible for the implementation of this Directive."); Article 7 ("the
competent authority or authorities referred to in Article 6 shall be required to
draw up as soon as possible one or more waste management plans").
96 Council Directive 91/689/EEC of 12 December 1991 on hazardous waste.
1991 O.J. (L 377).
Whereas the general rules applying to waste management which are laid
down by Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste . . . as
amended by Directive 911156/EEC (8), also apply to the management of
hazardous waste; Whereas the correct management of hazardous waste
necessitates additional, more stringent rules to take account of the special
nature of such waste; ... whereas the Committee set up by Directive 75/
442/EEC must also empowered to adapt the provisions of this Directive to
such progress, HAS ADOPTED ... DIRECTIVE [91/689/EEC].
Id.
97 See id.
98 "Member States shall also take the necessary measures to prohibit the
abandonment, dumping or uncontrolled disposal of waste." Council Directive 91/
156/EEC of 18 March 1991 amending Directive 75/442/EEC on Waste, art. 4, 1991
O.J. (L 78).
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creates rights and obligations for individuals enforceable within
their national courts."101 EC law "may come from one of three
sources: (1) the EC Treaty itself; (2) legislation adopted by
Member States' institutions; or (3) rulings of the ECJ."'10 2
The Treaty of Rome explicitly states that "[t]he [European]
Court of Justice shall ensure observance of law and justice in
the interpretation and application of this Treaty." 0 3 One of the
more common cases handled by the ECJ104 involves preliminary
rulings under Article 177, which provides:
The [European] Court of Justice shall be competent to make a
preliminary decision concerning (a) the interpretation of the
Treaty .. .where such a question is raised before any court or
tribunal of one of the Member States, such court or tribunal may,
if it considers that its judgement depends on a preliminary deci-
sion on this question, request the [European] Court of Justice to
give a ruling thereon. 10 5
Interpretation of EC law binds the member states, hence, posi-
tioning the ECJ at the top of the legal structure composed of the
national courts of the EC members.' 0 6
In a preliminary ruling, brought pursuant to Article 177 of
the Treaty, that could have hindered EC members' fight against
environmental crimes, the ECJ declared that EC Member
States have the legal right to press criminal charges against
companies and individuals who violate laws regarding the dis-
posal of hazardous waste.10 7 Italian defendants claimed that
the criminal charges against them should be dropped since EC
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Treaty of Rome, Jan. 1, 1958, art. 164, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 73.
104 For a listing of the common types of cases handled by the European Court
of Justice (ECJ), see White, supra note 69, at 842.
105 Treaty of Rome, Jan. 1, 1958, art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 77.
106 David Stoelting, The Jurisdictional Framework of the European Court of
Justice, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 193, 195 (1990).
107 Joined Cases C-58, 75, 112, 119, 123, 135, 140-141, 154 and 157/95. Sandro
Gallotti and others, 1 C.M.L.R. 32 (1997). Reference from the pretura Circondari-
ale di Roma, Sezione Distaccata di Tivoli and Sezione Distaccata di Castelnuovo di
Port, for a preliminary ruling in the criminal proceedings before that court against
Sandro Gallotti, Roberto Censi, Giuseppe Salmaggi, Salvatore Pasquire, Massimo
Zappone, Francesco Segna and Others, Cesare Cervetti, Mario Gasbarri, Isidor
Narducci, Fulvio Smaldone on the interpretation of Council directive 91/156/EEC
of 18 March 1991 amending Directive 75/442/EEC on Waste 1991 O.J. (L 78) 32.
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law does not establish penalties for noncompliance. 10  The ECJ
acknowledged that the Framework Waste Directive, 91/156,
does not set forth precise obligations regarding controls and
penalties.10 9
A directive is binding as to its result solely because it is
purely a statement of Council policy. 110 As such, "[t]he decision
of how best to accomplish the goal of the policy expressed in the
directive is left to each member-state legislature, with the in-
tent of permitting each to implement the policy as it sees fit.""'
The ECJ noted that the Member States have an obligation to
choose the "most appropriate" forms, hence, ensuring that the
conditions within the hazardous waste directives are adhered to
by the most effective means possible. 112
According to the ECJ:
Article 5 and the third paragraph of article 189 of the EC Treaty
must be interpreted as not precluding a member state from im-
posing criminal penalties to ensure compliance with the obliga-
tions laid down by Council directive 91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991
amending directive 75/442/EEC on waste, provided that those
penalties are analogous to those applicable to infringements of
national law of a similar nature and importance and are, in any
event, effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 13
Consistent with the objective of EC directives, the ECJ did not
mandate Member States to evaluate the criminal provisions ex-
isting in their environmental laws drafted in response to EC di-
rectives. However, the ECJ did fashion a very liberal guidance
rule for the Member States' national courts to evaluate the
criminal provisions in their environmental laws.
108 Member States May Impose Penalties to Enforce EU Law, THE REUTER EUR.
CoMMUNiTy REPORT, Sept. 12, 1996.
109 See id.
110 See Vine, supra note 71, at 448.
111 Id.
112 EU: Court of Justice - Infringement of Community Directive on Waste May
Give Rise to Penalties in Member States, REUTER TEXTLINE AGENCE EUR., Sept. 14,
1996.
113 Member States May Impose Penalties to Enforce EU Law, supra note 108.
[Vol. 10:237
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/10
19981 CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR A CORPORATION
C. An Assessment of EPA's 1990 Duty of Care Criminal
Provision
Unlike the EC's various waste directives, but similar to It-
aly's hazardous waste law, Section 34 of the United Kingdom's
EPA 1990 allows for criminal provisions. Since ECJ rulings are
binding on Member States, the statutory penalties of the EPA's
duty of care must be evaluated in light of the ECJ's recent pro-
nouncement regarding what constitutes acceptable penalties for
Member States' hazardous waste laws. According to the ECJ, a
Member States' penalties for hazardous waste violations must
be relatively comparable to those penalties that are imposed for
crimes that are similar in nature and of equal importance. The
ECJ also stated that in addition to this comparative analysis,
penalties for hazardous waste violations must be effective, pro-
portionate, and dissuasive.
On a broad scale, it is difficult to fathom what other crime
can be similar in nature and of equal importance to a law whose
objective is to preserve the environment. Unquestionably, great
harm is placed upon the victim of crime such as a rape, murder
or even fraudulent activity. In these instances, laws have been
created, initially, for the protection of these victims on an indi-
vidual basis, and secondly for society in general. Conversely,
environmental protection laws are enacted primarily to protect
society in general. Protection of the individual is a natural by-
product of this process. Illustratively, a community subject to
toxic chemical contamination is likely worse off than one struck
by a natural disaster because the long-term effects of the con-
tamination could result in the land being tainted for decades., 14
In an attempt to ascertain crimes that are considered to be
similar in nature, the severity of particular crimes was ranked
in a public opinion poll of 60,000 people. 115 Ranking "[i]n sev-
enth place, after murder but ahead of heroin smuggling and hi-
jacking, was environmental crime. According to the study,
industrial criminal polluters are considered to be worse in the
public's eye than armed robbers or those who bribe public offi-
114 Ginsberg, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9
HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 861-63 (1981).
115 See STARR, supra note 1, at 379 n.1.
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cials."11 6 This point was underscored during testimony given in
response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill:
[i]t seems very ironic to me that a man can go out and steal a
hundred dollars and get stuck in jail for several years, and the
enormous damage done by people such as [Exxon] is not really
punished in the significant sense at all. So I'm suggesting to you
that what we have here is a kind of Mafia of the economic world
that has to be punished in criminal terms. 117
In their ruling, the ECJ stated that the member states' na-
tional courts must make an independent assessment in order to
ascertain whether the penalties for hazardous waste violations
are "effective, proportionate and dissuasive." Although the EPA
1990 became effective on April 1 t 1992, the judicial system in
the United Kingdom will have a difficult time in making this
evaluation as the country's regulators and law enforcement
agencies have only recently begun to brainstorm on enforce-
ment issues. Environmental crimes have been categorized as
"the newest kid on the block... [and t]here is no doubt that the
problem is greater than is suggested by the current attention
given to it."118
A review of the United States' statistics may provide a
glimpse of the future for the United Kingdom provided they ag-
gressively pursue the enforcement of environmental crimes.
The United States' "federal environmental crimes program is
perceived by many outsiders as a successful, focused, and posi-
tive governmental effort." 119 Prosecution of individuals and cor-
116 Id.
117 Robert W. Adler and Charles Lord, Symposium Environmental Crime: En-
vironmental Crimes; Raising the Stakes. 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 781, 788 (1991)
(Testimony of Dr. Charles Konigsberg quoted in THE DAY THE WATER DIED: A
COMPILATION OF THE NOVEMBER 1989 CITIZENS COMMISSION HEARINGS ON THE Ex-
XON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 51 (1990) (sponsored and published by the National Wildlife
Federation in Cooperation with NRDC, the Wildlife Federation of Alaska, and the
Windstar Foundation).
118 UK: Department of the Environment - Environmental Crime - Outcome of
Today's Seminar, REUTER TEXTLINE - HERMES - UK GOV'T PRESS RELEASES, Oct. 16,
1996 (statements made by an unidentified delegate as re-quoted by Dinah Nichols,
seminar chairman and Director-General of Environmental Protection at DOE, at
the first environmental crime seminar held in London on October 16, 1996 and
attended by law enforcement agents and environmental experts).
119 Judson W. Starr, Symposium Environmental Crime: Turbulent Times at
Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental Criminal Prosecutions and the
Work that Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 900, 900, Apr. 1991 (noting e.g.,
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porate entities for environmental misconduct continues to grow
as public concern for the environment and demands for higher
standards of corporate accountability grow. 120 During the pe-
riod 1983 through 1990, 761 individuals and corporations were
indicted. 12 ' In 1990 the rate of conviction was at a record high
of 85 percent. 122 In 1997, criminal fines imposed by the U.S.
EPA surpassed civil penalties for the first time.' 23 The increase
in criminal referrals by the U.S. EPA to the U.S. Justice De-
partment is a direct result of the continued expansion of the
U.S. EPA criminal program.' 2
4
... Just as the English jury of the eighteenth century was be-
lieved to be reluctant to convict the poacher, even when he was
caught in the act, because it considered the penalty (typically,
capital punishment) too severe for the crime, so also are courts
likely to distort the substantive law of the duty of care if they be-
lieve the penalties are disproportionate. 12 5
While the ECJ ruling requires a proportional evaluation of the
penalties, it appears that the United Kingdom judicial system is
struggling to ascertain whether a jail term of up to six months
and/or up to 20,000 pounds, in the magistrate court, or an un-
limited monetary penalty and/or imprisonment of up to two
years in the crown court is proportionate for a violation of the
Hedges, Enviro-Cops On The Prowl For Polluters, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Oct. 9, 1989, at 23; Sanders, Battling Crimes Against Nature, TIME, Mar. 12, 1990,
at 54; Gold, Increasingly, Prison Term Is The Price For Polluters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 1991, at B6, col. 3; Abramson, Government Cracks Down On Environmental
Crimes, Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1989, at B1, col. 3).
120 See id. at 901.
121 See id. at n.3, referencing Memorandum from Peggy Hutchins, paralegal, to
Joseph G. Block, Environmental Crimes Section Chief, Department of Justice
(Dec. 13, 1990).
122 See id.
123 Drew Williams, A Record Year for John Q. Law, POLLUTION ENGINEERING
NEWS, Feb. 1998, at 9. The combined penalties levied by the U.S. EPA was $264.4
million. See id. Criminal penalties amounted to $169.3 million versus civil fines of
$95.1 million. See id.
124 Drew Williams, EPA Touts a Record Year for Fines, POLLUTION ENGINEER-
ING NEWS, Apr. 1997, at 9. In 1996, the U.S. EPA levied $76.7 million in criminal
penalties out of $173 million in total criminal, civil, and administrative fines and
penalties. See id.
125 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Second Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture Redesigning
Corporate Remedies: What Role for Private Ordering?; Lecture: No Exit?: Opting
Out, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies,
53 BROOK. L. REV. 919, 928-29 (1988).
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EPA's 1990 duty of care. The judicial system, when resolving
environmental law disputes, is wholly inadequate by failing to
keep pace with the progress of the laws themselves. 126 Thus,
while "[tihe High Court has neither the capacity nor the quali-
ties needed for addressing many environmental issues,"127 ex-
perience in the United States demonstrates that criminal
sanctions for violating hazardous waste laws have been effec-
tive and dissuasive.
IV. THE IMPACT OF Meridian Global Funds on EPA's 1990
Duty of Care Provision
A company is statutorily created in the form of a fictitious
person that is deemed to have certain powers, rights and duties
of a natural person. 28 Without rules to signify which acts are
to be those of the company, the creation of a fictitious person
would be meaningless. 29 Thus, a necessary component of the
corporate personality are rules by which acts are attributed to a
company (i.e., rules of attribution).1 30 Normally, the rules of at-
tribution can establish a company's rights and obligations. 31
The holding of Meridian Global Funds illustrates that in cer-
tain cases, a special rule of attribution must be consistent with
the language an underlying policy of the statute in question.
A. The Holding of Meridian Global Funds
In 1990, a group of investors tried to gain control of Euro-
National Corp, Ltd. (ENC), a publicly listed New Zealand com-
pany in order to use its cash-rich assets for their own pur-
poses. 132 Two of the investors, Norman Koo Hai Ching (Koo)
and Norman Ng Wo Sui (Ng) were employed by Meridian Global
Funds as their chief investment officer and senior portfolio
126 UK. Downed by Law - EC Environmental Legislation, REUTERS TEXTLINE -
GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 1991 (comment of Lord Justice Wolf to the Environmental Law
Association).
127 Id.
128 Meridian Global Funds, [1995] 3 WLR 413, 418.
129 See id.
130 See id. In their opinion, the House of Lords detailed the hierarchy of the
rules of attribution. An employee's act is attributed to a company via the com-
pany's: (i) primary rules of attribution which are found in its certificate of incorpo-
ration, and (ii) general rules of attribution, i.e., the principles of agency. See id.
131 See id. at 419.
132 See id. at 415.
[Vol. 10:237
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/10
1998] CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR A CORPORATION 261
manager respectively. 133 The investors' scheme was to
purchase a forty-nine percent controlling interest in ENC, fund-
ing the purchase with ENC's own assets.134
In order to accomplish their scheme, bridging finance was
needed to fill the gap between buying the shares and gaining
control of ENC's money. 135 The investors, through Koo and Ng
who acted independently from their employer, were to secure
funds from Meridian Global Funds. 136 Once the investors se-
cured control of ENC, they intended to divert the funds back to
Meridian Global Funds to pay the bridging finance.' 37 The
scheme faltered when the independent directors of ENC im-
posed conditions on the use of the company's money which re-
sulted in an attempt by Koo and Ng to extricate themselves
from the scheme. 138 The Securities Commission investigated
the scheme and brought charges against Koo, Ng, and Meridian
Global Funds for violating section 20(3) and (4)1 of the New
Zealand Securities Amendment Act of 1988 (Securities Act).' 39
These sections require every person who became a substantial
security holder of a public company listed on the New Zealand
Stock Exchange to give notice of his interest when he became
aware of it to the target company and Stock Exchange. 40
The lower court held that Meridian Global Funds knew
they were a substantial security holder in ENC via the attribu-
tion of Koo and Ng's knowledge. 14' The lower court did not pro-
vide any detail regarding the judicial basis for this
attribution.1 42 The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's
decision on a somewhat different ground.' 43 The Court of Ap-
peal decided that Koo's knowledge should be attributed to Me-
ridian Global Funds because he was the "directing mind and





138 Meridian Global Funds, [1995] 3 WLR 413, 416.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 417.
142 See id.
143 Meridian Global Funds, [1995] 3 WLR 413, 417.
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will" of the company.' 44 By leave of the Court of Appeal, Merid-
ian Global Funds appealed to the Lordships' Board, arguing
that the only "directing mind and will" of the company was that
of its Board of Directors, not Koo or Ng. 145
The House of Lords recognized that it is readily accepted
that a corporate entity "cannot do, know or intend anything in
its own right but only, if at all, through the instrumentality of
human beings."146 Once a statute has imputed responsibility of
the act or state of mind of an employee to the company, it is
readily inferred that this act or state of mind is that of the com-
pany.147 The House of Lords, however, stated that this princi-
ple is not necessarily always true and declined to decide the
case before them based on the widely accepted theory of "di-
recting mind and will." 148 The House of Lords categorized the
instant case as an "exceptional case,"'1 49 and declared that one
must do more than simply search for a "directing mind and will"
in order to assign corporate liability for the acts of their
employees.150
The House of Lords noted that the Securities Act was
stated in language primarily applicable to a natural person and
required some act or state of mind of that person, himself, as
opposed to employees. 151 The court posed the question; "[h]ow
is such a [statute] to be applied to a company?" According to the
House of Lords, statutes do exist for the purpose of attributing
responsibility for it to the company, but this attribute is not
144 See id. "The metaphor which has been used to describe knowledge" or con-
duct of senior level employees in a company has been the "directing mind and will."
PCW Syndicates v. PCW Reinsurers, [19961 1 All ER 774, [1996] 1 WLR 1136, July
31, 1995, citing Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., Ltd. [1915]
AC 705 at 713, [1914-15] All ER Rep 280 at 283 per Viscount Haldane LC ('active
and directing will... directing mind').
145 See id.
146 L.S. Sealy, supra note 22, at 508.
147 See id.
148 Meridian Global Funds, [1995] 3 WLR 413, 423.
149 See supra note 24.
150 Meridian Global Funds, [1995] 3 WLR 413, 419.
151 See id. "(3) Every person who ... becomes a substantial security holder...
shall give notice that the person is a substantial security holder ... to .... (4)
Every notice under subsection (3) . . . shall . . . [be given as soon as the person
knows, or ought to know, that the person is a substantial security holder in the
public issuer." Securities Amendment Act, 1988 (N.Z.) § 20(3), (4).
[Vol. 10:237
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/10
1998] CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR A CORPORATION 263
mechanical or automatic.152  In each case, the judge must de-
termine "whether there is an applicable 'rule of attribution'
which makes the human act count as the act of the
company."1 53
The House of Lords formulated a two-part query. First,
was the statute intended to apply to companies and, secondly,
given that the statute was intended to apply to a company;
whose act, knowledge or state of mind was for this purpose in-
tended to count as that of the company?154 The House of Lords
stated that the answer to the latter question can be found by
interpreting the relevant substantive statute, taking into con-
sideration the statute's language, content, and policy.' 55
B. Query One: Is the EPA 1990's Duty of Care Provision
Intended to Apply to Companies?
The duty of care provision embodied in the EPA 1990 is a
rule of law for which a court will need to fashion a special rule of
attribution. Section 34 of the EPA 1990 is written in language
primarily applicable to a natural person. This as well as the
criminal penalties that can attach for a breach of the statutorily
imposed duty of care categorizes the statute as an "exceptional
case."' 56 Moreover, apart from the written requirements, 57
which are absolute, the other elements of the duties are quali-
fied since the duty is to" . . . take all such measures ... as are
reasonable in the circumstances"'5 8 to ensure compliance with
the duties.159 As such, similar to the query the court posited in
152 Meridian Global Funds, [19951 3 WLR 413, 419.
153 Id. at 418.
154 See id. at 419.
155 See id. The House of Lords asserted this principle after comparing and con-
trasting the holdings of two of their previous decisions; Tesco Supermarkets, Ltd.
v. Nattrass, [1971] 2 All ER 127, and Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No 2),
Director General of Fair Trading v. Pioneer Concrete (UK) Ltd., [1995] 1 All ER
135, [hereinafter Tesco and Ready Mixed Concrete respectively]. See id. See supra
part IV.C. for a discussion of the holdings of Tesco and Ready Mixed Concrete.
156 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
157 For example, waste producers must provide a description of the waste to
the transporter before relinquishing control so that the transporter, as well as sub-
sequent handlers of the waste, are aware of the hazards associated with the waste
and therefore know how to handle the waste. See WASTE MANAGEMENT, THE DuTY
OF CARE, supra note 30 at 39.
158 EPA 1990, § 34(1).
159 Driscoll, supra note 15, at 503.
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analyzing the Securities Act, when confronted with a breach of
duty, the court will need to ask; how should Section 34 of the
EPA 1990 be applied to a company?
The House of Lords first inquiry was whether the statute in
question was intended to apply to companies. In answering this
inquiry, the House of Lords limited their discussion to two sce-
narios. 160 Under the first scenario, the court suggested that the
penalties of the statute in question should be assessed. As an
example, the court noted that statutes which impose penalties
that are limited to community service are not intended to be
applicable to a company. Similar to the Securities Act, Section
34 of the EPA 1990 provides for both monetary penalties as well
as jail sentences. While a corporate entity cannot be incarcer-
ated, it can be assessed monetary penalties for violating the
provisions of a statute. The payment of monetary penalties by a
company found to be in violation of an environmental statute is
not uncommon. 16' Hence, based on the penalty matrix of Sec-
tion 34 of the EPA 1990, the duty of care statutory provision is
intended to apply to corporate entities.
160 The second scenario offered by the House of Lords does not warrant an in-
depth discussion regarding its applicability to environmental violations. The
House of Lords noted that if the act given rise to liability was explicitly authorized
by a resolution of a company's board of directors or an unanimous agreement of the
company's shareholders, a court may interpret the statute as meaning that it could
be attributable to the corporate entity based on the primary rules of attribution.
Meridian Global Funds, [1995] 3 WLR 413, 420. See also supra note 122.
161 Allied Colloids, a United Kingdom based chemical company, was ordered to
pay fines and legal costs in excess of 100,000 pounds after prosecution by the Na-
tional Rivers Authority and the Health and Safety Executive when fire water run-
off, contaminated with chemicals, adversely impacted the Calder River during a
July 1992 fire at their chemical storage warehouse. See Will Hunton, UK: Red
Alert on Green Concerns, REUTER TEXTLINE MGMT TODAY, Jan. 5, 1995. The impo-
sition of a one million pound fine upon the Shell company was, by a considerable
margin, the heaviest penalty ever imposed for the release of pollutants to the envi-
ronment. See William Howarth, Parting the Waters, NEW L.J., Jan. 11, 1991, at
11. As a result of a fracture of a corroded oil pipeline, 30,000 gallons of crude oil
was discharged into the Mersey River resulting in extensive environmental dam-
age. See id. One of the most active prosecutors for environmental infractions is
the National Rivers Authority, which routinely assesses penalties on farmers, for
polluting 'controlled waters' with slurry and effluent, averaging 2,000 pounds plus
court costs. See Jonathan Ames, Law Down on the Farm - Talking to an Agricul-
tural Specialist Firm About Effluent, Subsidies and Combine Harvesters, L. Soc'Y
GAZETTE, Feb. 8, 1995, at 7. However, penalties of 10,000 pounds to 20,000 pounds
are not uncommon. See id. supra text accompanying notes 122-25 for recent crimi-
nal penalty statistics in the United States.
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C. Query Two: Whose Actus Reus and Mens Rea is to be
Deemed that of the Company Itself?
Having concluded that Section 34 of the EPA 1990 was
drafted for the purpose of compliance by a corporate entity, the
House of Lords second inquiry in Meridian Global Funds must
be addressed. According to the House of Lords, any act, knowl-
edge or state of mind "was to be deemed the act of the company
itself within the meaning or for the purpose of [the] substantive
rule.1 62 As applied to the statute under consideration, in carry-
ing out the duty of care associated with the generation, storage
and disposal of waste:163 which employee's act, knowledge or
state of mind should count as that of the company? Although
the House of Lords advocated the fashioning of an attribution
rule tailored to the language and policy of the substantive rule
in issue, the House of Lords' decisions in Tesco, Ready Mixed
Concrete, and Meridian Global Funds provides guidance in an-
swering the aforementioned inquiry.
In Tesco, the company was being prosecuted under a provi-
sion of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 (Trade Act) for advertis-
ing an item at a price less than that which it was selling the
item for in a particular store. 164 The House of Lords held that
the precautions taken by the Board of Directors (i.e., supervi-
sion and training), rather than the individual shop manager's
negligence, were to count as those of the company. 165 This ra-
tional was based on an examination of the purpose of Section
24(1) of the Trade Act 166 which was intended to give effect to "a
policy of consumer protection which does not have a rational
and moral justification.' 67 According to the House of Lords,
"[tlo treat the duty of an employer to exercise due diligence as
underperformed unless due diligence was also exercised by his
[employees] to whom he had reasonably given all proper in-
162 L.S. Sealy, supra note 22, at 509.
163 See supra note 5.
164 See [1971] 2 All ER 127.
165 See id.
166 An owner of a store will be provided a defense provided that he could prove
that the statutory offense was caused by "another person" and that "he took all
reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of
such an offense by himself or any other person under his control." Trade Descrip-
tions Act 1968, § 24(1) (1968).
167 Tesco, [1971] 2 All ER 127 at 151.
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structions and upon whom he could reasonably rely to carry
them out, would render the defense of due diligence [useless]
and so thwart the clear intention of Parliament in providing
it."168
Conversely, in Ready Mixed Concrete, the House of Lords
held that the act or state of mind of an employee should be at-
tributed to the company for the purpose of deciding whether the
company was in contempt. 169 In this case, executives of the
company, acting within the scope of their employment, made a
restrictive arrangement in breach of an undertaking by the
company to the Restrictive Practices Court. 170 The company's
Board of Directors had given explicit instructions not to make
these types of arrangements. 171 The attribution rule fashioned
by the House of Lords in this case was based on the acts of the
employees against the background of the Restrictive Trade
Practices Act 1976.172 The House of Lords reasoned, "a com-
pany [would] enjoy the benefit[s] of restrictions outlawed by
Parliament and the benefit arrangements prohibited by the
courts provided that the restrictions were accepted and imple-
mented and the arrangements were negotiated by ... employ-
ees who had been forbidden to do so by 'higher
management."1 73
In Meridian Global Funds, the House of Lords looked to the
underlying policy of the Securities Act which is to "compel the
immediate disclosure of the identity of persons who become sub-
stantial security holders in public issuers."174 The House of
Lords concluded that with regard to a corporate security holder,
unless the knowledge of the person who acquired the relevant
interest is to be attributed to the knowledge of the company, the
policy of the Securities Act would be defeated. 175 Any other
holding would encourage a company's board of directors to not
168 Id. at 158.
169 Ready Mixed Concrete, [1994] 3 WLR 1249.
170 See id. at 1253.
171 See id.
172 See id. at 1251-52.
173 See id. at 1254-55.
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pay attention to the investments being made by their invest-
ment managers. 1
76
D. Formulating an Applicable Rule of Attribution for
Violations of the Controlled Waste Duty of Care
Section 34 of the EPA 1990 places a statutory duty of care
on any person who imports, produces, carries, keeps, treats or
disposes of a controlled waste. 177 In a manufacturing environ-
ment, the answer to the following questions are of significant
importance to the parties involved:
Who is the producer of waste - the company (i.e., board of direc-
tors) or the "blue- collar" employee working on the production
line?
Who is the keeper of waste - the company (i.e., board of direc-
tors), the "blue- collar" worker who placed the waste in storage, or
the "white-collar" employee who directed the "blue-collar" em-
ployee on where and how to store the waste at the company's
facility?
These, as well as other questions will arise when a breach of
duty by an employee results in pollution to the environment or
harm to human health. Which employees' acts, knowledge and/
or state of mind is deemed to be that of the company's - the
directing mind and will of the board of directors, the "blue-col-
lar" employee, the "white-collar" employee, - all three?178 The
House of Lords in Meridian Global Funds stated that the an-
swer to these questions can be found by interpreting the rele-
vant substantive statute while taking into consideration the
statute's language, content and policy.
176 See id.
177 See supra note 16.
178 The statutory language is clear on its face when a corporate director or
other officer of the company breaches the duty of care;
... [wihere an offence under any provision of this Act committed by a body
corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent or conni-
vance of, or to have been attributable to any neglect on the part of, any
director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate
or a person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he as well as
the body corporate shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be
proceeded against and punished accordingly.
EPA 1990, pt. IX, § 157(1) (1990).
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Case law addressing the language of Section 34 of the EPA
1990 does not provide any meaningful guidance. In R v. Hert-
fordshire County Council, ex parte Greene Environmental In-
dustries, Ltd. ,179 the Queens Bench Division of the High Court
of Justice stated that "[t]he words 'any person' [in Section 34 of
the EPA 1990] in our judgement mean precisely what they
say."180 The court's interpretation, however, was in response to
an attempt by legal counsel to have the court restrict the mean-
ing of "any person" to include only those who hold waste dispo-
sal licenses.181 The court concluded by stating that "we are not
prepared to write into [Section] 34 words which are not there in
order to give the section a more restricted meaning when Par-
liament, in our judgement, intended no such thing."18 2
It is a fundamental legal practice to look at the legislative
history and policy that gave rise to a statute when the meaning
of the statute is not clear on its face. As a member of the EC,
the United Kingdom's EPA 1990 is rooted in the Treaty of
Rome18 3 and the hazardous waste policies and directives 8 4 de-
rived therefrom. Equally important is Parliament's policy
which echoes the EC policy; all waste management options
"should be managed and, where necessary, regulated to prevent
pollution of the environment or harm to human health."8 5 Sec-
tion 34 of the EPA 1990 extends the waste management policy
to the producer, keeper and carrier. In sum, the legislators at
all government levels intended to give effect to a policy of socie-
tal protection.
The content of Section 34 of the EPA 1990 is espoused by
"the common law principle.., that a person owes a duty not to




183 Particularly significant is Article 130R(2) which states, "[aiction by the
[Member States] relating to the environment shall be based on the principles that
preventive action be taken... and that the polluter should pay." Single European
Act 1987, art. 130R(2). See also supra note 73.
184 See supra note 93 (discussing the EC's Statement on Waste Policy); supra
note 95 (discussing the EC's Framework Waste Directive 91/156).
185 Driscoll, supra note 15, citing Department of Environment Circular 11/94,
para 9B. The Circular promotes a hierarchy of waste management options includ-
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injure others by his acts or omissions. '18 6 The "duty" concept,
however, presents some difficulty when applied to the manage-
ment of waste since much depends on the technical competence
of the holder of the waste18 7 as well as the working conditions
that are dictated by the financial resources of the employer. For
example, should the breach of duty caused by a lack of technical
knowledge by a "blue-collar" employee be attributed to a com-
pany in light of the statutory language of Section 34 of the EPA
1990 which limits the duty of care to that which is reasonable
under the circumstances? More easily answered would be the
question of whether the breach of duty by a "blue-collar" or
"white-collar" employee, caused by unreasonable circumstances
created by a lack of financial resources by the employer, would
be attributable to the employer.
Based on the foregoing analysis and the House of Lords'
reasoning and holdings in Tesco, Ready Mixed Concrete, and
Meridian Global Funds, it would be logical to surmise that the
House of Lords would attribute a breach of duty, of the require-
ments of Section 34 of the EPA 1990, by either a "blue-collar"
employee or a "white-collar" employee, to their employer, the
corporate entity. The relevant consideration appears to be the
purpose behind the EPA 1990. Similar to the Restrictive Trade
Practices Act of 1976 in Ready Mixed Concrete, the corporate
entity would simply "enjoy the benefits" of the profits that can
be gained by illegal activities derived from the breach of duty
associated with hazardous waste even if the acts were explicitly
forbidden by the employer. For example, the misclassification
of waste or the escape of waste to the environment while in stor-
age would result in lower operating costs in the form of lower
disposal costs or a lack of disposal costs respectively. Both of
these events contravene the underlying purpose of the EPA
1990 which is to protect society from the pollution of the envi-
ronment and the harm to human health.
Similarly, consistent with the rational in Meridian Global
Funds, if the knowledge of the person who breached the duty of
care is not attributable to the company, the policy of the EPA
186 ESTATES GAZETTE, supra note 14, at 83.
187 R.H. Burett-Hall, Environmental Regulation in the United Kingdom Its De-
velopment to the Present Day and Trends for the Future, 12 INT'L ENVTL. CURRENT
REP. 461, 468 (Sept. 13, 1989).
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1990 would be defeated. In many perceived situations, the po-
tential harm caused by the breach of duty could be mitigated.
Since knowledge tends to equate to power, any other conclusion
would encourage the company to not pay attention to the waste
management activities of their employees so that a claim could
be made that it was beyond the company's power to prevent the
breach in the first instance and secondly, to mitigate any resul-
tant damages.
In light of the reasoning and holding in Tesco, an argument
can be made that the acts, knowledge or state of mind of neither
a "blue collar" employee nor a "white collar" employee should be
attributed to the corporate entity. In Tesco, the company
claimed that they provided adequate training and supervision
to the store manager to ensure compliance with the statutory
requirements and, hence, this employee's negligence should not
be attributed to the company.' 88 Similar to the statutory de-
fense available to the company in Tesco, Section 34 of the EPA
1990 requires the Secretary of State to issue a Code of Prac-
tice 18 9 "for the purpose of providing to persons practical gui-
dance on how to discharge the duty imposed on them."190 Since
this Code of Practice is admissible as evidence, as to whether a
person has complied with the duty of care,191 it would appear,
following the reasoning of the Tesco court, that if the efforts of
the company are not recognized, the purpose of the statutory
defense would be meaningless. Therefore, based on the House
of Lords' rational in Tesco, it would seem that a breach of duty
by an employee, regardless of their place in the corporate hier-
archy, could not be attributable to the company.
However, the Court's holding in National Rivers Authority
v. Alfred McAlphine Homes, poignantly dismisses the argument
made by the company in Tesco.- 92 In McAlphine, the company's
site manager accepted responsibility for the pollution and resul-
tant fish kill when cement was washed off of a residential site
into a stream. The company argued that it could not be held
188 See id.
189 See supra note 42.
190 EPA 1990, § 34(7).
191 See supra note 15.
192 See Will Hutton, UK: Red Alert on Green Concerns, REUTER TEXTILE MGMT
TODAY, Jan. 5, 1995.
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liable for the acts of its employees. 193 The Magistrate's Court
agreed, stating that the site manager was not high enough in
the corporate hierarchy in order for his acts to be considered as
"those acts . .. of the company."194 The High Court, however,
overturned the decision by holding that companies can be held
liable for acts of an employee which causes pollution since "com-
panies are in a position, by direction, education and training, to
ensure that the employees do their work in such a way as to
prevent pollution."195
Lastly, the distinguishing feature in Tesco is the House of
Lords' interpretation of the purpose of Section 24(1) of the
Trade Act which the court considered to be a consumer protec-
tion policy that does not have a moral justification. While there
is some equivalency between a "consumer protection policy" and
a policy of societal protection that underlines the EPA 1990,
Section 34 of this act embodies a moral justification. This moral
justification is clearly evident by the plain language of the stat-
ute which requires a person to handle waste with a duty of care,
hence, the duty not to injure others by his acts or omissions.
As noted earlier, the conclusion derived from the forgoing
analysis is that a company cannot escape liability, via a lack of
attribution, for the breach of duty by one of their employees,
regardless of the employees' position. This conclusion is forti-
fied by the recent landmark holding of R v. British Steel Plc. 196
In British Steel, the substantive statute was Section 3(1) of the
Health and Safety Act 1974 which places a duty on employers to
ensure that others are not exposed to risk that would endanger
their health and safety.197 Similar to Section 34 of the EPA
1990, the duty of care in the Health and Safety Act is qualified
by the degree of reasonableness appropriate to the circum-
stances. The company in British Steel could not escape liability
by showing that it had taken the steps necessary at a senior
employee level to ensure the safety of others, since the operat-
ing employees did not take all of the reasonable precautions
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the breach of a duty of care by operating level employees (which
can include both "blue-collar" and "white- collar" employees)
was attributed to the company.
V. CONCLUSION
The recent holding in Meridian Global Funds is significant
as it shows a "transformation of traditional judicial attitudes
based on notions of director and officer control, to a modern un-
derstanding of the power of corporations to produce economic
and personal harm and the consequent importance of seeking to
control them through effective mechanisms of criminal law."199
This holding comes on the heels of the fundamental overhaul of
the United Kingdom's waste regulations which shifts the em-
phasis from regulating the final disposition of waste towards
the United States' approach of regulating the whole waste cycle
from "cradle-to-grave." Due to the substantial penalties for
non-compliance, including criminal penalties, it is clear that
"[p]eople must [have] ... no doubt as to their personal responsi-
bilities and the standards expected of them."20 0
What is ambiguous is whether a breach of these responsi-
bilities by an employee would be attributed to his employer
making the company potentially liable for criminal penalties.
In Meridian Global Funds, the House of Lords clearly deline-
ated the need to fashion a rule of attribution for statutes such
as Section 34 of the EPA 1990 rather than applying a common
rule of attribution based on the search for a "directing mind and
will." Consistent with the House of Lords approach, Section 34
of the EPA 1990 was intended to apply to companies and a
breach of duty by any employee involved with the management
of waste will be considered to be that of the company. This prin-
ciple is based on an interpretation of Section 34 of the EPA 1990
taking into consideration the language, content and policy of
the statute.
If attacks are levied upon Section 34 of the EPA 1990 prior
to the fashioning of a rule of attribution by the judicial system;
it is positioned to survive these challenges. The underlying pur-
pose of the statute is consistent with the waste management
199 Wells, supra note 22, at 1327.
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policies advanced by the relevant Articles of the Treaty of Rome
and the EC's waste directives. Moreover, the criminal provi-
sions in the EPA 1990 appear to be within the guidelines estab-
lished by the ECJ.
For better or for worse, environmental criminal law "is a
subject which everyone appears to have a clear and immutable
position."20 1 Since the early 1980's, "[t]he relationship between
environmental crime and its proper punishment [has been and]
will remain a controversial question" in the United States.20 2 It
is anticipated that the duty of care provision in Section 34 of the
EPA 1990 will invoke a similar response from corporate enti-
ties, particularly when the United Kingdom's judicial system
attributes criminal liability to them as a result of an employee's
breach of duty.
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